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I 
~'' 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
FLORA K. JONES, widow, and DONNA JONES, 
MELBA JONES, HAROLD JONES, LINDA 
JONES and SHIRLEY JONES, minor children 
of HAROLD }fiNOR JONES, Deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
and CALIFORNIA PACKING CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 
Defendants. 
THE ISSUE 
Though they state the proposition in various ways 
and in different places in their Brief (P. 2, 43), Counsel 
for Plaintiffs concede that the only question in this 
case, as they say "under the rules of law applicable to 
the review herein to be had'' is whether the Commission 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in deciding as it did. 
What are the rules of law applicable in a review of 
decisions of the Industrial Commission by this Court 
are not set out when the issue is stated, but appear later 
in the Brief under the caption ''Binding Effect Of 
Commission's Decision" (P. 29) in quotations from de-
cisions of this Court, and indeed those ''rules'' are so 
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well settled as to admit of no dispute. The principal 
decisions are reviewed in the case of W oodhur~ ·vs. In-
dustrial Commission et al, 111 U. 393 (181 P. 2nd 209). 
The Court ilJ. that case (speaking .through J uetice Wolfe) 
said: 
''The extent of review by this Court in this type 
of case is: Did the Commission act without or in 
excess of its powers in :denying compensation to 
the plaintifff Section 42-1-78, U.C.A. 1943. 
"The test applicable to this type of case to de-
termine whether or not the Commission acted 
without or in excess of its powers has been clearly 
crystallized by previous opinions and was stated 
as follows in Kent v. Industrial Commission, 89 
Ut11h 381, 57 P. 2d 724, 725.: 
'In the case of denial of compensation, the 
record must disclose that there is material, 
substantial, competent, uncontradicted evi-
dence sufficient to make a disregard of it 
jl),stify tb~ conclusJop., a~ a ,matter of lawJ 
that the Industrial Commission arbitrarily 
and capriciously disregarded the evidence or 
unreasonably refused to believe sucb evi-
dence.' 
''In Lora;nge v. Industrial Commission, 107 Utah 
261, 153 P. 2nd 272, 273, we quote with approval 
from K~va1inakis v. Industrial Com.xnission, 67 
Utah 174., 246 P. 698, as follows: 
'Unless therefore it can be said, upon the 
whole recorD., that the commission clearly aeted 
arbitrarily or capriciously in making its findings 
and d-ecision, this court is powerless to il).terfere. 
* * * It was not intended, * * * that this Court, 
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in matters of evidence, should to any extent sub-
stitute its judgment for the judgment of the com-
mission.' 
''See also Gagos v. Industrial Commission, 87 
Utah 101, 48 P. 2d 449; Stoddard v. Industrial 
Commission, 103 Utah 351, 135 P. 2d 256. 
"Upon the whole record, as a matter of law, did 
the Commission act arbitrarily or capriciously in 
finding that the coronary occlusion or throm-
bosis which plaintiff suffered was not precipitated 
or caused by an accident arising out of or in the 
course of his employment 1 '' 
Other cases upon the limitations governing the Court 
in such a review as this to the same effect are cited by 
Counsel, namely, Robertson vs. Industrial Commission, 
109 U. 25, 163 P. 2nd 331, and Ostler v. Industrial Com-
mission, 84 Utah 428, 36 P. 2nd 95. 
Inasmuch as in this case, as in the Woodburn case, 
a coronary occlusion is involved, the question in this 
case may be stated as it was in that case: JJpon the 
whole record, as a matter of law, did the Commission 
act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding that the coro-
nary occlusion which decedent suffered was not pre-
cipitated by an accident arising out of or in the course 
of his employment? 
THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION 
As is perhaps to be expected from counsel against 
whose client the decision went, counsel for plaintiffs 
are extremely critical of the Commission's decision. 
They say that it "intermingles findings, arguments, 
conclusions and judgment". Whether it is subject to 
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such or any criticism, and especially whether there is 
anything inherent in it which discloses that the Com-
mission acted arbitrarily or capriciously can best be de-
termined by an examination of it. Inasmuch as it is not 
set out in full in Plaintiffs' Brief, at the outset we set 
it out in full herein: 
''BEFORE THE· INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Claim No. 5283 
FLORA K. JONES, widow, and DONNA 
JONES, MELBA JONES, HAROLD 
JONES, LINDA JONES, and SHIRLEY 
JONES, minor children of Harold Minor 
Jones, deceased, 
.APPLICANTS, 
vs. 
CALIFORNIA P ,A.CKING CORPORATION, 
DEFENDANT. 
DECISION 
''The above entitled cause came on regularly for 
hearing at Ogden, Utah, December 5, 1950, at 
10 :00 o'clock .A.M. in the County Courthouse, be-
fore the Industrial Commission of Utah, pursuant 
to Order and Notice of the Commission. .Appli-
cant was present and represented by her at-
torneys, Clyde C. Patterson and Stuart P. Dobbs; 
defendant was represented by J . .A. Howell and 
Neil R. Olmstead, attorneys. 
''It is not disputed that ~iinor Jones died as a 
result of a coronary occlusion. The only issue 
to be resolved is the cause of the occlusion. Was 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
it the result of an accident arising out of or in 
the course of employment' We think it was not. 
In the determination of that question, the re-
sponsibility is upon us to find the ultimate fact. 
In Utah Delaware lYiining Co. v. Indemnity Com-
pany, 76 U. 187, 289 P. 94, the Utah Supreme 
Court said: 
'Whether the present disabilities were or 
were not attributable to the injuries received 
at the time of the accident, constitute the 
ultimate fact or question to be determined 
by the Commission. They were not bound 
to accept a mere opinion of an expect on such 
an ultimate question unless such was the 
only reasonable conclusion to reach in the 
premises.' 
''We are not unmindful of, nor do we disregard 
the opinion of the physicians as to the autopsy 
findings on the physical condition of the body 
and the medical theories founded by experts on 
the cause of coronary occlusions. We do, how-
ever, hold that the Commission and the Com-
mission alone can and must determine the ultimate 
issue; namely, was the injury (coronary occlu-
sion) caused by an accident arising out of or in 
the course of employment by defendant. 
''In other words, assuming that exertion, emo-
tional upset, fatigue, worry, gas may cause a 
coronary occlusion alone or in combination, was 
there exertion, etc, sufficient to cause the occlu-
sion in this particular individual, not overlook-
ing, of course, the physical and mental makeup of 
the deceased' Furthermore, we may or. may not 
believe the evidence introduced to prove that the 
exertion etc. singly or in combination Were suf-
ficient to charge the employment with liability 
for the injury. 
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''Commissioner Wisley viewed the premises with 
the consent of the parties. He does not believe 
that movement of the air through the building 
was sufficiently obstructed to create an unhealthy 
condition in the area where the motors were situ-
ated. The motors were not enclosed. Further-
more, although we may assume that a balky 
motor gives off some carbon dioxide gas, there 
is not evidence to support a finding that the 
oxygen content of the air breathed by deceased 
had been reduced to such an extent that the oxy-
gen content of the blood was sufficiently reduced 
to cause 'sludging' of the blood which in turn 
caused the blocking of the coronary artery. In 
fact, the gas theory is important only if we ac-
cept the "Sludging" theory, which we do not. 
''The evidence regarding exertion, fatigue, worry 
is very unsatisfactory. In fact, if we believe all 
that evidence, we must conclude that deceased 
was not subjected to any of these factors in a 
degree materially in excess of the exertion, etc. 
to which all individuals in every walk of life or 
at home are subjected. 
''The physicians who testified all stated that they 
were not concerned with exertion, gas, or fatigue 
except in combination. All of them stated that 
all of the circumstances combined might contri-
bute to the occlusion. We do not believe that the 
combination of circumstances which applicant at-
tempts to prove constitute an accident and that 
the employer should be charged with the results 
of a combination of forces operating within and 
without the employment over a period of days, 
particularly when everybody is almost daily sub-
jected to the same forces in substantially the 
same degree. 
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''There is still much confusion and 'disagreement 
among medical men as to the cause of coronary 
occlusions. Some hold that exertion may cause 
an intimal hemmorhage and thus :result in an 
occlusion. In this case the autopsy revealed no 
break in the intima and no hemmorhage. A tumor 
or blister was discovered at the point of the 
occlusion. This was filled with Cholesterol (fatty 
molecules) but had not ruptured. It was of long 
standing as was the scleroais of the artery in 
which the clot was found. The autopsy reveals 
none of the findings relied upon by those who 
believe in the exertion theory. 
''Applicant cited authority in support of the exer-
tion theory, but it should be noted that the ex-
perts used the words ''severe exertion''. The 
same is true of fatigue. Th-ere 1s no evidence .of 
exertion or fatigue. 
''No evidence of monoxide gas pol.soning was 
found nor any evidence that carbon dioxide was 
a factor. In fact, we find no medical authority 
to support the gas or "sludging" theory of Dr. 
Zeman. 
''Emotional upsets, severe, are sometimes named 
as a cause of coronary occlusion. We are inclined 
to give credence to this view. However, the 
evidence in this case does not justify a finding 
o.f a severe emotional upset. 
"In conclusion, we point to the fact that all the 
doctors stated that they attached no significance 
to any of the factors such as exertion, gas, fatigue 
or nervous strain, standing alone, but they did 
say that it was possible that all the surrounding 
circumstances over a period of two or three days 
might have contributed to the occlusion. This 
theory would charge every employer with every 
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occlusion (and other ailments) occurring on the 
premises, during the hours of employment, and 
for that matter with occlusion and other ailments 
which occur off the premises before or after the 
hours of employment if not too remote in point 
of time. We cannot subscribe to that theory. 
''We find that the coronary occlusion which 
caused the death of Minor Jones was not the 
result of an accident arising out of or in the 
course of his employment, nor was it_contributed 
to by any of the conditions or activities of the 
deceased in connection with his employment, or 
by any combination of them, and if the occlusion 
is determined to be an accident, we find that the 
employment had nothing to do with the occlusion. 
The application is therefore denied. 
"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the appli-
cation of Flora K. Jones, widow of Harold Minor 
Jones, deceased, is denied. 
(SEAL) 
(Signed) Otto A. Wiesley, Chairman 
R. H. Dalrymple, Commissioner 
H. Fred Egan, Commissioner 
February 16, 1951. '' 
We submit that the decision on its face certainly 
does not disclose that the Commission acted arbitrarily 
or capriciously, on the contrary it discloses that the 
Commission carefully considered all of the evidence, and 
the claims of the Plaintiffs that they were entitled to 
an award, and after such consideration decided against 
such an award. To determine, then, the question as to 
whether the Commission acted arbitrarily of caprici-
ously the Court must consider the evidence as a whole, 
because if there is any evidence to sustain the ultimate 
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fact found by the Commission, namely that the coronary 
occlusion which caused the decedent's death was not 
precipitated by an accident arising out of or in the course 
of decedent's employment, then the decision of the Com-
mission must stand in accordance with the ''rules apli ... 
cable" to this review, as above set out. N otwithstand-
ing these "rules", which counsel for plaintiffs concede, 
counsel seem to contend that this Court may substitute 
its findings for the findings of the Commission, or else 
it is impossible to account for their request at the con-
clusion of their Brief that the Court should not only 
reverse the Commission's decision, but itself make an 
award to plaintiffs or direct the Commission to make 
sueh an a ward. 
It would seem that inasmuch as the Court in this 
case will have to examine the entire record in order to 
determine the issue in this case it is a work of super-
erogaton for the parties to make a statement of facts, 
which necessarily will be at least to some extent partisan. 
However, as counsel for plaintiffs have made an elabor-
ate statement of the facts from their point of view, we 
deem it proper to make one from ours, and especially 
to point out wherein, as we conceive it, the other side 
has not correctly stated the facts, or has exaggerated 
them, or drawn unwarranted inferences therefrom. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant, California Packing Corporation, 
operates a plant in Weber County for the processing of 
vegetables, including peas. As preliminary to such pro-
cessing of peas, it is necessary to shell them, and in the 
season of 1950, for that purpose, the company maintained 
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a number of viners in the area, including one at Field-
ing, Clinton, Syracuse, Huntsville and Hooper (Tr. 
173), to which the peas were hauled still in their shells 
upon the vines, and there threshed from them the peas 
which were then trucked in boxes to the cannery. The 
operation of these viners is, of course, a seasonal oper-
ation, and because of the perishable character of the 
product they must be speedily handled over a brief 
period of time. The evidence in this case discloses that 
prior to the run of peas, or the starting of the campaign, 
as it is called by those concerned with it, a meeting was 
held by the plant superintendent with those who had 
been selected to act as field men and as foremen at the 
various viners. At that meeting, Harold Minor Jones, 
who had been selected as foreman of the Hooper Viner, 
was present. The duties of Mr. Jones, as such foreman 
of the Hooper Viner were of a supervisory character, 
hiring his crew and training them to do the work the 
way he wanted it done, to see that the viners operated 
properly, that the viners were run at the right speed, 
and to see that the shelled peas were loaded for transpor-
tation to the cannery as quickly as possible (Tr. 176-
177). 
At this meeting he was given authority to organize 
a double crew to operate the viner when he deemed it 
necessary, and also to employ a relief foreman for him-
self. This is important because some point is made in 
the Brief of Plaintiffs that subsequent to Decedent's 
death there were two foremen. The operation was just 
getting started and had not reached it peak on July 
3rd when Jones died, and moreover the fact that he 
had not employed a relief foreman as he had a perfect 
10 
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right to do, is the best evidence that he did not consider 
himself so fatigued or tired as to need one and that in 
fact he was not (Tr. P. 177). 
Jones was an experienced foreman; he had worked 
for the Company since several years before 1938 (Tr. 
173), and he had been foreman of the Clinton, Syracuse, 
and Huntsville viners; the Syracuse and Huntsville 
Viners 'had the same number ( 4) of viners as the Hooper 
Viner (Tr. 173), and his duties at the Hooper Viner 
were substantially the same as at the other Viners, of 
which be had been foreman (Tr. 177). 
Counsel for Plaintiffs in their Brief assume that 
the crew which Jones selecled was composed of inex-
perienced men because only one of them testified he had 
worked at the Hooper viner before. The reason that 
the one witness so testified was that he was asked a 
question which demanded such an answer. (Tr. 75) He 
also said that one other of the crew had worked at the 
viner (Tr. 75). The others were not asked, nor was the 
witness as to whether they or the others had worked at 
other viners. Ergo, say counsel, they were inexperien-
ced which is as unwarranted an inference as many of 
the others made by counsel. Moreover, there is .abso-
lutely nothing to show that the crew was not perform-
ing its duties to the satisfaction of the foreman, or that 
the manner in which it performed its work had any 
emotional or other effect on Jones. 
The viner shed at Hooper, as is the case with the 
other sheds operated by the defendant Company, was 
a structure consisting of a galvanized iron roof with 
the necessary supports for it, covered at the north and 
11 
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south ends, which were thirty-six feet in width, with 
the same material, but substantially open on the east 
and west sides, such sides being ninety feet long. It's 
character is best shown by the floor plan and photo-
graphs introduced in evidence by plaintiffs (Exhibits 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10). Exhibit 3 shows the floor plan 
with the dimensions and location of the machinery, the 
four viners, the motors, one being a large engine, and 
the other being a small engine, spoken of as the ''booster 
motor''. The large motor by means of a belt operated 
the shaft, which in turn by means of belts operated the 
viners, and the booster motor, as its name implies, was 
used in connection with the large motor to increase the 
power to speed up the viners when there was a full load 
(P. 51), and that period had not as yet been reached 
in the run. 
Counsel draw the inference because Jones was en-
gaged in the morning of July 3rd attempting to have 
it in operation, that the large motor could not operate 
the viners, but the best proof that such was not the 
case is that the viners were being operated, and Jones 
himself during the morning was helping to load the 
peas that had been threshed by such operation. 
The greater part of the testimony introduced by 
plaintiffs was devoted to an attempt to show that not-
withstanding the open character of the shed, as shown 
by the photographs, it was on July 3rd so obstructed 
that the air in the vicinity of the little motor could not 
circulate and created an unhealthy condition, presumably 
because of the claim that there was an excessive amount 
of carbon dioxide in the air (P. 20, 21). So counsel 
claim that the finding of the Commission that no such 
condition existed is against the uncontradicted evidence. 
12 
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The only reason counsel say that the circulation of 
air was so ob8tructed is their claim that the stacked 
boxes of peas on the west side of the shed shut off the 
circulation of air from the west, and the trucks loaded 
with pea vines on the east. The evidence shows that 
both were changing situations, both with respect to the 
loaded pea boxes which were regularly being removed, 
so that at least at times there would be open spaces 
along the west side ( Tr. 65, 73), and the same was true 
as to the trucks. 
However this may he, the testimony of plaintiffs.' 
witnesses as well as defendants, shows that there wa.s a 
loading platform on the west of the viner approximately 
opposite the little motor, which was kept clear of boxes 
in order to enable loading operations to be carried on 
(see Exhibit 3), the only difference being as to its width, 
the testimony of Plaintiffs' witnesses giving the width 
of two and one-half feet in width (Tr. 58), and the testi-
mony of defendants' witnesses six feet in width (Tr. 
193.). ~forever, Exhibits 5, 6, 7 and 8, show an open 
space above the conveyors, beyond which the boxes of 
peas were not piled, several feet in width and e~tend.., 
ing along the west side from the south side to a point 
north of where the small motor was located. No testi-
mony contradicts the existence of this open space. Coun-
sel make a great deal of the fact that su,hsequent to 
Jones death some of the galvanized sheeting were re-
moved from the west side, but whether by the Company, 
or by whom, or the extent or purpose thereof, is not 
shown, although counsel draws the unwarranted infer-
ence that such removal was an admission on the part 
of the Company that the circulation of air in the shed 
was impeded beyond what it should have been. 
13 
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Counsel also assume that in order for there to be 
proper air conditions in the shed, and at the place where 
Jones was working on July 3rd, both sides of the shed 
would have to be completely open, which is an unwar-
ranted assumption. 
So far as the east side is concerned, the trucks and 
wagons of the growers which were hauling the pea vines 
to the viner, were as they came in lined up on the east 
side parallel to it. Each truck was approximately 
twenty feet in Jength and four were so placed at a time, 
so that there were open spaces between them, aggregat-
ing the difference between the ninety feet length of the 
platform and the eighty feet of trucks, or approximately 
eight to ten feet, or at least two feet between, even ac-
cording to Plaintiffs' witnesses (Tr. 85). Moreover, 
while at least one witness for plaintiffs testified that 
some of the larger loads on the trucks as they came in 
were higher than the top of the opening, so that the 
hauler had to arrange his load so as to come under the 
open space, he likewise testified, as was bound to be 
the case, that as they were unloaded the space between 
the top of the opening became greater and greater until 
the bodies of the trucks were reached ( Tr. 59). At all 
times and for the full length of the shed on the east side 
there would, of course, be additional open spaces above 
the hoods of the trucks and under their bodies. It is there-
fore impossible to conceive that the circulation of air was 
impeded to such an extent as to bring about an '' un-
healthy condition" at the place or places where Jones 
worked on July 3rd, the date of his death, nor do such 
condition in any way justify the statement of counsel 
that such places were ''hemmed in''. Certainly they do 
14 
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not warrant the claim that the finding of the Commission 
was against the uncontradicted eYidence, especially in 
light of the fact that the Commission who heard the 
case, in addition to hearing all the evidence, went out 
and viewed the viner at the time of the hearing, which 
was December 5, 1950. 
Counsel for their Brief are extremely critical of 
the Commissioner who conducted the hearing with res-
pect to this matter. They say ''We submit that the 
Commissioner may well be charged with lack of that 
constructive imagination requisite to visualize, on a 
winter's day, with the machinery removed, the enclosing 
sides altered, and no obstructions about the place, just 
what the conditions were like the preceding July 3rd. '' 
(P. 21) There is nothing to show, however, that in mak-
ing the finding that there was not sufficient showing 
of a lack of circulation of air of a character which would 
in anywise contribute to the coronary occlusion suf-
fered by decedent, the Commissioner who heard the 
evidence failed to consider his view in the light of such 
evidence, which is all that is required of the trier of the 
facts. The trier of the facts is not required to substi-
tute, imagination "constructive", or otherwise, as a 
substitute for proof. The gravamen of the complaint 
of counsel for Plaintiffs against the Commission in 
this, as in other instances, to which we shall have occa-
sion later to say, is that in making its findings of fact 
it failed to exercise some sort of imagination, as a sub-
stitute for proof. 
Finally, in this connection, we deem it proper to 
invite the Court's attention, and as bearing upon the 
question as to the "unhealthy condition" of the air in 
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the vicinity of the small motor, the testimony of Dr. 
Zeman, the medical witness, upon whom Counsel for 
Plaintiffs most rely, because he elminated the condi-
tion of the air as a cause of the coronary occlusion, (Tr. 
122, 134, 144) which Jones suffered. The result of the 
doctor's statement is that he would concur in the Com-
mission's finding as to the condition of the air in the 
shed where Jones was working. 
The run or campaign for peas at the Hooper viner 
commenced on June 28, and on that day it was operated 
for eight hours, from eight thirty until four thirty, and 
Jones worked those eight hours on that day, according 
to his time card. The method of keeping the time of the 
foreman at the viners was for them, including Jones, to 
keep their own time by punching their own time cards. 
The Hooper viner was not operated on June 29, but 
Jones punched his time card for eight hours on that day. 
What work he did on that day is not disclosed by the evi-
dence. The viner was operated on June 30 from six 
thirty is the morning to six in the afternoon, or 11% 
hours, and Jones punched his card for that number of 
hours. On July 1 the viner was operated from five 
thirty to six forty five, or thirteen and a quarter hours, 
and Jones punched his card for that number of hours. 
On July 2 the viner was operated from two forty five 
a. m. to five p. m. or 14 hours and fifteen minutes, but 
Jones punched his card for 15 and one-half hours, or 
until 6:15p.m. The evidence shows that he was at the 
viner after it had ceased to operate, but what work, if 
any, he did during that hour and fifteen minutes is not 
disclosed by the evidence. On July 3rd, the day of Jones 
death, the operation was commenced at 2:00 a. m. and 
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he punched his card as commencing his work at that 
hour and his card was punched as ending his work at 
10 a.m., or a period of eight hours. 
Counsel for Plaintiffs in their Brief assume that 
he worked longer than shown by his own record. Coun-
sel on cross-examination asked these questions of the 
1Ir. Wethers, Plant Superintendent, who had testified 
as to these time cards : 
'' Q. There may be more time than shows on these 
cards! 
A. If he don't punch the card. 
Q. If he put in more hours, it would not show? 
A. No, but I have not had that occasion to hap-
pen yet." (Tr. 178). 
Certainly it did not happen in Jones' case, at least 
so far as July 3rd is concerned, because his card was 
punched as showing he completed his ·work at 10 a. ni. 
(Tr. 176). and he left the viner for his home sometime 
between nine o'clock that morning and ten o'clock, which 
would be somewhat less than eight hours. The net re-
sult is that after having worked for at tnost fifteen and 
one-half hours, and perhaps not more than fourteen and 
one quarter hours, he was not required to be at work 
until two o'clock the following morning, or a period of at 
least seven hours and more for eating, rest or sleep, or 
whatever else he chose to do. How he spent the hours 
between is not disclosed by the evidence, except that in 
the evening he milked his cows (Tr. 115). 
His wife testified that her husband came home about 
seven thirty; that they had supper, but that he did not 
go to bed until about eleven o'clock, although he had laid 
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down in front of the door in the living room prior to 
that time, and he did not get up until about ten or fif-
teen minutes to two in the morning (Tr. 33), when he 
dressed and left for work (Tr. 33). She said that he kept 
turning and tossing in his sleep. Asked what caused him 
to have difficulty in sleeping she answered it was solely 
the heat which affected her the same as him ( Tr. 41). 
He came back at 6 :30 in the morning for breakfast, 
and then went back to work, and at that time the evi-
dence does not disclose that she observed anything what-
soever wrong with him. 
There is considerable testimony as to the heat that 
morning, and particularly in the vicinity of the small 
motor at the viner, the testimony being that the thermo-
meter in the large motor showed two hundred degrees. 
Whether it is sought to be implied that the temperature 
was the same as that in the interior of the motor is not 
clear, but, of course, that would not be true any more 
than the fact that the temperature of the water in the 
motor of an automobile would cause the temperature 
to be the same in the automobile, and just how hot it 
was at the home ·or. in the shed where the small motor 
was located is not shown with any exactness. There is 
the testimony of the wife already referred to that it was 
very hot in the house, and there is testimony that it was 
very hot in the shed in the vicinity of the motor. How 
hot no one could say with any exactness. However, the 
official temperature~ at the Municipal Airport were 
introduced in evidence. They show that the maximum 
temperature on July 1 was 98 degrees, which maximum 
may be higher than the hourly readings, on July 2, 92 
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degrees, and on July 3, 93 degrees. What is more per-
tinent is that at 12:30 a.m., July 3rd, it was 69.3 degrees; 
it gradually went down until at 6 :30 it was. 65 degrees, 
then started to raise until at 8 :30 it was 71.1; at 8 :30, 
75.2 and at 9:30, 78.8 (See sheet of Tr. 26). The exact 
distance of the airport to the viner was not shown, be-
cause the Commissioner did not deem that important 
(Tr. 186), and we make no claim that the temperatures 
would be exactly the same everywhere in the area, but 
at least it is the best evidence that could be had. 
In the light of these facts, as to the actual hours of 
labor and the prevailing heat, we now must consider 
the evidence as to just what was the character of the 
work Jones was doing, and the circumstances thereof 
during the afternoon of the 2nd and the morning of 
July 3rd. It appears that about five o'clock in the after-
noon of the 2nd, after the run, Mr. Porter, who is the 
auto mechanic boss of the Company, and Mr. Geiger 
visited the viner and talked to Jones, who said he was 
having trouble with the small motor, and they cleaned 
the spark plugs and checked it. There is no evidence 
that they changed the rings, as claimed by counsel for 
the plaintiffs in their Brief. It then seemed to run all 
right (Tr. 180). Neither Porter or Geirger saw him any 
more, but Porter talked to him over the telephone about 
seven o'clock on the morning of the third, when Jones 
told him that he had had a lot of trouble with the motor. 
Porter asked him what it was, and Jones said it ran 
about forty-five minutes that morning and that after 
that he had had trouble with it. So Porter told him he 
was pretty sure what the trouble was, and that if he 
(Jones) would make the measurements so a flexible line 
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could be procured to hook on an auxiliary, he (Porter) 
would send it down (Tr. 182). However, this change 
could not be and was not made until after Jones' death 
(Tr. 182). This is important, as we consider, because 
some of the witness for Plaintiffs testified that the large 
motor would not run the viners properly without the 
small booster motor even when, as was the case, the peak 
load had not been reached. This was contradicted, as we 
shall later point out, by the fact that it actually did. 
But certainly Jones did not consider that there was any 
emergency which required. immediate action else he 
would have so informed Porter. Moreover, this inci-
dent demonstrates that Jones was not emotionally upset 
because the booster motor was not running properly, 
else he would have so indicated to Porter. It is to be 
borne in mind also that this incident occurred a short 
time prior to Jones becoming sick. 
There is considerable conflict in the testimony as 
to the extent to which Jones was "tinkering" _with the 
small motor during the period, and the consequences 
flowing therefrom, except there seems to be no dispute 
that the character of work he was doing in that regard 
was substantially the same on both the 2nd and the 3rd 
(Tr. 86). 
One witness for Plaintiffs, Othello Munn, one of 
Jones' crew, testified he was "tinkering" with the small 
motor, either attempting to adjust the carburetor or 
attempting to crank it continuously between two o'clock 
on the third and the time he became sick ( Tr. 49), and 
counsel made the same assumption in putting their hypo-
thetical question to the doctors they called as witnesses, 
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and in their Brief. But, of course, that cannot be so, 
because Jones himself told Porter on the telephone it 
ran all right for forty -five minutes, as above shown, he 
spent considerable time in helping to load peas, as above 
shown, and he went home to breakfast during that per-
iod. ~IoreYer, on cross examination the witness admit-
ted he only observed Jones cranking the little motor two 
or three times. (Tr. 62). There is likewise a diversity 
in the testimony as to the results of the difficulty Jones 
was having with the small motor. Some witnesses 
say that while Jones was working on the motor, it was 
still connected with the belt, while at least one witness 
for plaintiffs says it was disconnected for a period of 
four hours prior to Jones' sickness and this is contra-
dicted by other witnesses. (Tr. 81). Some witnesses 
say that from the gasoline fed into it, there was gas com-
ing from the motor even when it could not be started, 
which is, of course, impossible, and others when it went 
a little there was· gas coming from both the gasoline and 
the oil. What the gas was, whether carbon dioxide or 
carbon monoxide is not disclosed, or the quantity of it. 
Considerable stress is laid upon the fact that there 
were breaks at the joints of the stove pipe connected 
with the exhaust from the motor. This pipe went up 
through the roof (Tr. 89). One witness on direct exam-
ination said that smoke came out at the first joint, 
which was about the height of a man's face (Tr. 97), 
and another witness on cross examination said he obser-
ved no smoke coming out, but saw it going up the pipe 
(Tr. 99). It should be noted also that Frazier, the viner 
superviser, when he came to the viner in that capacity 
on July 3rd about 6:30 in the morning said on cross 
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examination by Plaintiffs' counsel that he did not notice 
any fumes, either gasoline or oil fumes (Tr. 190). In 
any event, no traces of gas were found in the lungs or 
in the blood, and as indicated, Dr. Zeman eliminated had 
air as a cause of the coronary occlusion suffered by the 
decedent and also carbon monoxide. 
Absolutely no evidence was offered as to the amount 
of effort required to crank the small motor or indeed 
as to how it was cranked, except that to do so Jones had 
to bend over it. 
Yet, this testimony is claimed by counsel to show 
such unusual effort, or strain, such extreme fatigue and 
emotional upset without contradiction so that a find-
ing by the Commission to the contrary is arbitrary and 
capricious, and as we view it, such a claim is wholly un-
warranted. 
There is no dispute that the cause of Jones' death 
was a coronary occlusion, but when or where he suf-
fered the attack is not shown. He was apparently all 
right at six-thirty in the morning when he went to break-
fast and at seven o'clock when he talked to Porter over 
the telephone, but from that time until he went outside 
and laid down no witness who testified saw him, and 
therefore no one can say when or where he was when he 
suffered the attack. The only evidence is that he was 
observed outside the shed lying down (Tr. 63). When 
he was observed lying outside several witnesses went to 
him and talked to him, and he said he had a headache, 
that he had a pain in the stomach and in the chest (Tr. 
64). No one testified that he was sweating at that time, 
nor did he complain of sweating. The best estimate of 
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the time is that it was about eight-thirty when he went 
out, and he laid there about an hour. Then he said he 
thought he would be better and came back into the shed, 
but did no work at that time, and about nine-thirty 
started for home (Tr. 63, 79, 91). His home was about 
a city block from the Yiner, about 660 feet (Tr. 32). 
At about nine-thirty his wife saw him coming, he was 
staggering and when he reached home he said he was 
terribly sick at his stomach and he had a pain in the 
mid portion of his chest, and in his back (Tr. 37). He 
was sweating profusely (Tr. 37). He laid down on 
the bed, and within a few minutes he was dead (Tr. 12). 
We have now summarized the evidence of all the 
witnesses other than that of the doctors, as fairly and 
impartially as we can, and there remains only to con-
sider the evidence given by the doctors. 
As appears from the evidence of the doctors in this 
case, as well as the quotations from medical authori-
ties cited by them, medical opinion is divided as to 
whether fatigue, emotion, strain or other conditions 
may cause a coronary occlusion. One school of medical 
opinion is that there is no relationship whatsoever 
between the character of the fatigue, emotion, strain 
or other conditions. The leader of this school is Dr. 
Masters, whose opinions are quoted in the testimony 
of Dr. Zeman. It is conceded that he has conducted more 
experiments, and made a greater investigation of the 
subject that any one else. As a result of these exten~ 
sive experiments and investigation, he found that the 
incidence of coronary occlusion relative to any stated 
activity in the course of twenty four hours approxi-
mates the percentage of the day that is devoted to that 
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specific activity; ir.. other words, that as many coronary 
occlusions occur during the proportion of hours of 
the day of twenty four hours that are spent in rest 
or sleep as during the proportion of hours spent 
at work (Tr. 113). Another school frankly states that 
it is impossible to say whether or not coronary occlu-
sion is due to any of such conditions, that the most 
that can be said is that it is possible there may be. This 
was the testimony of Dr. Zeman, as a witness for the 
plaintiffs in the Woodburn case, supra, but this Court 
held in that case that such testimony would not justify 
it in setting aside a denial of the award in that case. This 
is the opinion to which Dr. Peterson, who testified for 
the defendants adheres. Now, some two and one half 
years later, again testifying for the claimants, Dr. Ze-
man testified that there could be a relationship of at 
least fatigue, strain or emotional upset, d~ending 
upon the degree thereof, so be says that, assuming the 
facts stated in a hypothetical question by plaintiffs' 
counsel, discarding however, the facts so stated with 
respect to bad air and carbon monoxide, and basing 
his opinion on the assumed facts as to fatigue, strain 
and emotional upset, there was such connection in this 
case. 
The facts assumed in the hypothetical question 
were that 
"Jones was a man about thirty nine years of 
age and apparently in good health prior to the 
time of this fatal attack and bad worked approxi-
mately sixteen or seventeen hours on the 2nd day 
of July after a night in which be bad little sleep, 
only a few hours, and went to work on July--
be came home July 2nd and went to bed about 
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ten-forty-five, for perhaps an hour, tried to sleep 
in the doorway on the floor, in the doorway in 
front of the house, it being hot. Finally he went 
to bed, and again, at twenty minutes to two he 
went to work about fiye minutes later. During 
the previous day he had had a good deal of trouble 
with an engine, a gasoline motor, a portion of 
the machinery operating the viner in which he 
worked, and shortly thereafter he arrived at 
the plant, on Monday, the 3rd, and devoted his 
time very largely, practically all of his time, to 
working upon the gasoline motor; that the motor 
was located in a space perhaps six by eight or 
ten feet wide, illustrated by some photographs 
which ·we have here. And particularly direct-
ing your attention to the exhibits which have 
been placed in evidence, Numbers 4 and 1, and 
also directing your attention to the plat which 
shows substantially the location of the struc-
ture, but does not show the presence of the shed 
which you see in the photographs, which shed 
was between the motors and the front of the 
growers' unloading area at the building. You 
also see upon the plat the location of the motors, 
but from the photograph you can see the posi-
tion of the shed. From this small motor, a pipe, 
an exhaust pipe led to the top of the building, 
and it had cracks in it a short distance above the 
motor. The motor would run for awhile and then 
begin to backfire, on one cylinder and another, 
and sometimes it would quit. It was connected 
by a system of belts, to a larger motor, and also 
that motor was running this motor, and although 
it would quit operating of its own accord, but 
would nevertheless continue to turn over and 
cause the gasoline to be injected into this· pipe. 
That the big motor temperature was over two 
hundred degrees at times. In the rear of the 
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building on the opposite side of these motors the 
sheds were filling with boxes at times full of peas, 
as the work was done. That when the boxes 
were in place there was substantially no air admis-
sion in that area on that side opposite the shed, 
except a narrow opening about two and a half 
feet wide near the motors. That in doing the 
work they frequently had occasion to crank the 
motor after the belt was disconnected, and his 
work was done there squatting or bending over, 
largely engaged in trying to correct the carbure-
tor. That while so engaged, approximately at 
nine o'clock, eight-thirty to nine, some six and 
a half or seven hours after he came to work, he 
became ill and complained of stomach trouble 
and violent headache and pain in the chest. He 
layed down for approximately an hour, and then 
proceeded to his home a short distance away. On 
entering the home -- before going into that, the 
day itself was a warm day and the building in 
which he worked, as you observe from Exhibit 
6, was the type called a galvanized iron roof and 
sides, and the space in which he worked was 
quite confined. 
''When he entered the yard he was seen to 
stagger and he walked into the house and said 
something to his wife to the effect that he was 
ill and proceeded into the bedroom where he was 
found shortly after that on the bed, his face was 
white and profuse sweating. The paleness of the 
face had been observed while he was at the viner 
before that. Very shortly after that his face 
took on a darker tings. He apparently was 
unable to recognize his wife, and he died within 
a relatively short time after entering the house.'' 
(Tr. 116, 117, 118). 
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This question upon objection of counsel for defend-
ant was modified by adding the following: 
'• Q. I will ask you, Doctor, to assume he 
was tinkering around the motor, at times work-
ing on the carburetor, and at times cranking the 
motor, the crank being in the lower part of the 
motor and the carburetor on its side ; that a part 
of the time he "Tas tinkering around otherwise 
and cranking and working with the carburetor. 
We have not the exact number of times he had 
cranked the motor during the period immediately 
prior to the time he became ill, except he was 
doing these things. With that additional state-
ment with respect to it. 
"Q. The area in whi-ch he worked was not 
enclosed in the sense it was sealed in, but it was 
obstructed by the viner machines and by the 
motors ~hemselves, and by the boxes and by the 
conveyor belt, but the building was quite open 
but with very little air space from the outside. 
The space was not entirely closed but the flow 
of air was obstructed in the manner I have de-
tailed. With that further explanation I will ask 
you if you see a causal connection between the 
factors I have mentioned and the man's death~" 
(Tr. 121, Tr. 122). 
It is obvious, that the Doctor did not confine him-
self too strictly to the facts, as stated in the question, 
because in his explanation of his answer he assumed 
that Jones was under an emotional strain which caused 
an inability to perform his work. He said also ''whether 
he did more work than ordinarily that would certainly 
be a factor" (Tr. 123). He also said that any one of 
the single factors stated in the question would not be 
sufficient; it would have to be a combination of them 
(Tr. 123). 
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Dr. Zeman, as shown by the evidence, is a path-
ologist, not actually engaged in practice, and it was he 
who performed the autopsy on the body of the decendent. 
It appears from his report upon the autopsy and his 
testimony that the cause of death was "the recent com-
plete occlusion and thrombosis of the descending branch 
of the left coronary superimposed upon old athero-
matous plaques, which he explained to be a thickening 
of the wall, which is due to the deposition of a fatty-
like substance known as cholesterol, and results in a 
narrowing of the coroary artery. Except that this 
condition was old, the doctor could not say exactly 
when it might have occurred. It could have existed from 
birth (Tr. 123-125). This condition is not discoverable 
by any physical examination prior to death (Tr. 197), 
and although it is inferable that decedent was in the 
hospital at least once at some time, it does not appear 
it was in connection with this condition (Tr. 42). How-
ever, it is important because with that condition existing 
an acute attack might occur at any time, at any place 
and under any conditions. 
As already stated, Dr. Zeman stated that the effect 
of fatigue, strain or emotional upset depended upon 
the degree of any of such factors (Tr. 131, 136), and of 
course, the Commission, as ti·iers of the facts, had to 
find the degree, and having found, as we submit it had 
a right to do in the light of the evidence, that none of 
these factors existing in that degree assumed in the 
hypothetical question, and the doctor's explanations 
of his answer, then it was entirely justified for that 
reason alone in rejecting his conclusion. J~ 
~ J 
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There is another reason why the Commission was 
justified in rejecting his conclusion. Most medical 
men, who say that there may be a causal connection 
between fatigue, effort or emotion-if severe-do not 
attempt to explain the connection. Dr. Zeman, how-
ever, attempts to do so by a theory that such factors 
might cause a sludging of the blood. Inasmuch as this 
theory was flatly rejected by Dr. Peterson in his testi-
mony, the Commission had a right to reject it. 
Dr. Olsen, the other doctor who testified for plain-
tiffs, was asked substantially the same hypothetical 
question, with this amendment: 
'' Q. If you will assume the facts as they were 
presented at that time, with the amendments as 
they have been made, and supposing one addi-
tional feature; that this man was working in an 
area relatively confined, at least partially filled 
with smoke or exhaust at times, have you an opin-
ion -- add one additional factor to that; that 
during the latter part of his employment and 
before he became ill he showed outward mani-
festations or symptoms; that he was from time 
to time engaged in cranking this motor, do you 
have any opinion whether or not these facts have 
any relation to the cause of death~" (Tr. 158). 
It was pointed out, upon the objection by Defend-
ants' counsel, that there was no evidence as to the extent 
of the fumes. Notwithstanding the Commissioner con-
curred, he permitted the amendment (Tr. 158). To the 
question was also an addition which stressed the extent 
to which "the air was shut off" (Tr. 161), and notwith-
standing the Commissioner thereupon said ''I am not 
sold on the air being shut off,'' he permitted the ques-
tion. (Tr. 160). 
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The Doctor's answer was ''It is my opinion that 
the facts as they existed, on those facts, there was cau-
sal connection between those facts and the occurance of 
the coronary occlusion.'' 
His testimony, then, differs from Dr. Zeman's in 
that he took into consideration all the factors stated in 
arriving at his conclusion and did not eliminate any of 
them as did Dr. Zeman. He did say, however, that the 
effect of any of the factors depended on the extent, or 
degree thereof (Tr. 164-166), and did not refuse to 
swallow any of them, as did Dr. Zeman. 
As he did not discriminate among them, the result 
is that his opinion ·is to be disregarded if the Commis-
sion was justified in finding that any of them did not 
exist to t:he extent or degree that they could be con-
sidered to be contributing factors. 
Inasmuch as the Commission had to find the facts, 
not merely, assume them, so we may, as we said con-
cerning Dr. Zeman's testimony, inasmuch as it found 
that such factors did not exist to the extent or degree 
that there could he any causal connection between them, 
and the coronary occlusion, the Commission had the un-
doubted right to reject his conclusion. The only other 
witness who te3tified was Dr. Peterson, a witness called 
for the defendant.. It seems to us that couns.el for plain-
tiffs in their brief are· unfair to Doctor Peterson, because 
therein they claim that he agreed with the other two doc-
tors, but such js not the case, because he frankly stated 
that in his opinion it was impossible to say whether or 
not there was any causal connection between the factors 
assumed and coronary occlusion, and fairly considered, 
that is the· extent of his testimony. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
THERE IS EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUP-
PORT THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE: BY THE 
CO~IMISSION. 
Counsel for Plaintiffs in Point 1 of their Brief 
state what they assume to be the proposition to the con-
trary, thus: 
• 
''That the Findings of Fact do not find support 
in the evidence taken by the Commission.'' 
Under Point 2 they say 
''That the facts in evidence do not support the 
Commission's conclusions that Jones' employ-
ment had nothing to do with the occlusion." 
Under Point 3 they say 
''That the Commission erred in its conclusion 
that Jones' death was not the result of an acci-
dent arising out of or in the course of his em-
ployment. '' 
In Point 4 
"That the Commission erred in its conclusion 
that Jones' death was not contributed to by any 
of the conditions or activities of the deceased in 
connection with his employment, or by any com-
bination of them. 
and in Point 5 
''That the Commission abused its discretion in 
entering its decision denying an award to the 
plaintiffs, and that its decision and order were 
against law, and that in reaching such decision, 
the said Commission did not . regularly pursue 
its authority.'' 
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and under our Point 1, we ask that what we have to say 
be considered an answer to all these five Points in the 
Brief of Counsel for Plaintiffs, which substantially state 
the contrary of the same proposition as stated by us, 
namely, there is evidence in the record to support the 
Findings of Fact made by the Commission. 
First of all, it is not clear to us, by their statements 
under these Points as to exactly what they claim, whether 
they claim that the Court will review the facts for the 
purpose of determining whether the Court would have 
found the facts as did the Commission, or whether it 
will confine itself to a determination as to whether 
there was any evidence to sustain them, because if 
there is such evidence, then it cannot be said that the 
Commission acted arbitrarily or capriciously or that 
it did not regularly pp.rsue its authority. It is not a 
question as to whether the Commission ''erred'', or 
abused its discretion, for under the law, as fixed by 
this C~urt, and as set out heretofore herein and even 
in Counsel's Brief, the limitations on the Court's re-
vie.w of the Industrial Commission are defintely fixed 
by the Legislature and as crystallized by the decisions 
of this Court, and are, as above stated. 
As we havfl already pointed out, to determine the 
question as to whether the Commission acted arbitrarily 
or capriciously, it will be necessary for the Court to 
examine the Record. Counsel for Plaintiffs in thei\ 
Brief have stated what they consider the evidence shows, 
as we have done herein, but after all the Court must 
examine it and determine the matter itself. For the 
reason that we have already stated, the evidence as 
we consider it to have been, to specifically now state why 
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we consider that the Commission did not act arbitrarily 
or capriciously would be mere reiteration. However, 
we do submit that, as we view it, the Court in this par-
ticular case does not need to restrict its review, because 
even if the Court should determine the facts de novo, it 
would find them precisely as the Commission did. 
It is conceded that if there is any connection at all 
between effort, or strain, fatigue, or any other condi-
tions and a subsequent coronary occlusion, it depends 
upon the extent or degree thereof. Counsel cite a num-
ber of Utah cases. All of these deal with the subject 
of effort, or strain, and all of them say that in order 
for there to be any connection between effort or strain 
it must be of a degree other than that which is required 
in the ordinary course of the work in which the em-
ployee . is engaged. Some of the cases speak of that 
effort or strain as "over exertion", as "severe", as 
"unusual", "too great for the man to undertake the 
work", etc., and all connoting that it must be of a 
character which is out of the ordinary. 
The difficulty of counsel for the Plaintiffs is, then, 
that there is a lack of evidence as to the degree of the 
effort or strain which they claim. 
It consists wholly of the effort or strain in cranking 
the small motor. There is dispute as to the length of 
time in which decedent was engaged in trying to start 
the small motor, but in any event, prior to his heart 
attack he had ceased to attempt to start it. What is 
more important is that there is no evidence whatsoever 
as to the amount of energy required to start or crank 
the motor, and it is a mere matter of speculation as to 
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what effort or strain was required. In those cases, in 
which this Court has held that the effort or strain 
sufficed, the proof was clear as to the degree so as to 
bring the case within the requirements fixed by the 
Court. Counsel for Plaintiffs apparently are aware 
of this lack of proof because in their Brief they seek to 
have this Court take judicial notice of the fact that crank-
ing a motor, whatever its size, is "strenuous exercise", 
(P. 24), and compare this motor to an old model T. 
Ford. The difficulty of making up for a deficiency of 
evidence by ''judicial notice'', or common knowledge·, 
is that such knowledge is that motors are of various 
size and condition, from the smallest to the largest, 
and of all varieties and vintages, and the amount of 
energy required is in relation to such size and condition 
and there is no evidence of the effort or strain, or 
exercise required of any individual to start this parti-
cular motor, not even any evidence as to whether it 
was larger or smaller than an old Model T. Ford, or of 
what variety or age. In the performance of his duties 
the decedent was used to starting this motor, so not only 
is there no evidence of the energy of any individual 
to start it, but no evidence of the energy required of 
decedent. In the absence of such evidence, the Com-
mission could not find that there was effort or strain 
of the character required by the decisions of this Court, 
and if it had so found, its finding could not have been 
sustained. 
None of the cases specifically deal with the other 
factors which Counsel claim contributed in combination 
with the strain of starting the motor to cause the 
coronary occlusion which Jones suffered. None of the 
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Utah cases specifically deal with fatigue, emotional 
upset or any other condition other than effort or strain, 
but we assume that the same rule would apply to such 
factors, namely, that they would have to be of the same 
extent or degree as in the case of effort or strain. 
It is claimed that decedent was fatigued at the time, 
but there is absolutely no evidence that he was or the 
extent thereof. The record can be scanned from one 
end to the other and no evidence can be found that he 
was, and even if he were there is no evidence that the 
employer could be charged with responsibility for it. 
It is true he worked long hours on the 2nd, but so far 
as the employer is concerned, he had at least seven hours 
between the completion of that work and when he com-
menced work again-how he spent or used those hours 
was a matter of his own choosing, not his employer, nor 
is the employer responsible for his manner of using or 
spending it and he had not yet worked eight hours after· 
that interval, indeed much less up to the time he quit 
doing any actual work. 
Counsel in their Brief raise the query as to whether 
or not this Court will take judicial notice of the Federal 
wage and hour law ( Tr. 23). There need be no question 
about it, if it is pertinent, but when it does it will like-
wise take judicial notice of the exceptons therein in the 
case of seasonal work such as this as to an eight hour 
day being a normal day's work. Irrespective of this, 
there is not shown by the evidence any degree of 
fatigue on the part of Jones, or indeed any fatigue, 
and if the Commission had so found it would have been 
in the teeth of the evidence. 
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The only other factor which Plaintiffs can rely 
upon as }laving, in combination with others, contributed 
to the coronary occlusion Jones suffered is "emotional 
upset", but here again there is no evidence whatsoever 
that he was emotionally upset, on the contrary it is not 
shown that he was even when he became sick. 
About all that counsel can claim is that, according 
to their notions, he should have been. "What they claim 
should have upset him was that he should have become 
exasperated because he could not start the small motor, 
as counsel conceive they would have been. They con-
cede that "some of the members of the Court may not 
have experienced the emotion which arose in the human 
breast when the Model T quit, backfired, etc.'' so they 
proceed to tell the court how they felt presumably as a 
result of their experience. But this recollection on their 
part cannot be a substitute for evidence which does not 
exist. On the contrary, as late as seven o'clock, just 
after he had been to breakfast, when there is no indi-
cation that he was upset, he had his conversation with 
the employee of the company who had charge of motors 
and whom Jones told of his trouble with the small motor 
and Porter told him he thought he knew what the. 
trouble was, to make the necessary measurements so 
that the trouble could be eliminated. There is no evi-
dence that Jones made these measurements or reported 
them to Porter. It is to be borne in mind that Jones as 
foreman was charged with the responsibility of keeping ' 
the viner in operation so as to take care of the peas as ·~ 
they came into it, he was not himself required to make ~ 
any repairs to the motors. There were other employees 1 
who were charged with that responsibility. So when he j 
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reported the difficulty and the employee whose respon-
sibility it was to take care of the matter, Jones' re-:-
sponsibility ended. T·wo conclusions irresistably result 
from this, first that at least so far as Jones was con-
cerned,-and that is the important thing-he considered 
that the operation of the viner was not interfered with 
by the fact that the small motor would not run. In 
other words, that the large motor would carry the load. 
And, secondly, that he was not worried, or disturbed, or 
emotionally upset because it would take some time to 
make repairs so the small motor would run, else he 
would haYe made the making of the repairs an emergency 
matter. 
The other claims of Counsel for the Plaintiffs, as 
to the air being hemmed in and the gas, of whatever 
character, as contributing causes, we do not deem it 
necessary at this point to discuss, because they were 
eliminated, as we have heretofore shown, by Plaintiffs' 
principal expert. In other words, we claim, as the 
Commission found, that the facts in this case boil down 
to this, that Jones, at the time in question, was perform-
ing his duties in the ordinary way in which he was ex-
pected to perform them, not exposed to any conditions 
that would not be expected to be encountered at the 
beginning of such a run or campaign as had commenced. 
It cannot be assumed that there would not be difficulties 
encountered under the circumstances, alse there would 
be no deed for a foreman. Suddenly he suffers a coro-
nary occlusion, either while at work or thereafter, 
which because of the condition already existing in his 
body might result at any time and any place, in a coro-
nary occlusion. From these facts alone it is to be pre-
sumed that such occlusion is compensable~ We submit 
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that to so assume would make coronary occlusions hap-
pening while at work or thereafter the equivalent of an 
occupational disease, although no legislative enactment 
has made it such, and would be going beyond what this 
court has ever held, and constitute legislation upon its 
part. 
In this connection, we invite the Court's attention 
to the following statement in Counsel's Brief: 
''The Commission may consider itself as merely 
determining the ultimate fact when it denied 
that Jones suffered an accident, arising out of 
the course of his employment, that the condi-
tions under which he worked did not contribute 
to his ailment, and that if he did suffer an acci-
dent, it had nothin_g to do with his work and was 
not compensable. But when a finder of facts 
sets forth the reasoning by which he approaches 
that ultimate fact, and thereby discloses such 
an unreasonable disregard of the evidence as 
this decision discloses, the validity of all results 
:reached must be tested by the steps taken to 
reach them and cannot be conjectured to have 
been placed on any higher ground than the steps 
disclose to have been attained. So judged, as 
we think it must he judged, the entire decision 
of· the Commission rests upon an entirely in-
,adequate foundation.'' 
As we interpret this language, what counsel mean 
to say is that if the Commission had contented itself 
with finding merely the ultimate facts, then such find-
ing could not be assailed, hut because, as they claim, 
there was no sufficient foundation for the findings of 
particular facts, whether one or more or all is not clear, 
found by the Commission, it must be held to have acted 
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arbitrarily or capriciously. We do not understand such 
to be a correct statement, because in a review such as 
this, it is the ulimate fact, and not the subsidiary facts, 
which must be shown to have been arrived at arbit-
rarily or capriciously. Howeverr, assuming without 
conceding, that counsel is correct, we proceed at the 
risk of some repetition to consider the particular facts 
as to which it is claimed the Commission acted arbit-
rarily or capriciously in the finding that they did not 
contribute to the coronary occlusion. 
POINT 2 
THERE IS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
FINDING BY THE CO:MMISSION AS TO THE 
PARTICULAR FACTS FOUND BY THEM. 
Counsel states these findings and their objection 
to them under five letter headings in two places, and we 
shall consider them seriatim. 
(A) as Eta ted on page 18, is as follows; 
''That the Commissioner who viewed the pre-
mises did not believe the movement of the air 
through the building was sufficiently obstructed 
as to create an unhealthyy condition in the area 
where the motors were situate.'' 
It is more elaborately stated on Page 20. In the 
latter, it is stated that the view by the Commissioner 
is the only evidence in the record contrary to the evi-
dence that Jones as he worked on the booster engine 
was so hemmed in as to produce an unhealthy condi-
tion there. We have at length set out the evidence which 
shows that there was no such "hemming in", as claimed 
by counsel, and have shown that there is no justifica-
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tion for the claim that the Co,mmission did not take 
into consideration the evidence as well as the view in 
determining that it was not proven that there was any 
sufficient hwk of purity in the air to cause or contri-
bute to the coronary occlusion suffered by Jones. We 
have further pointed out tha.t that finding is concurred 
in by at least one of Plaintiffs' medical experts, Dr. 
Zexn.an. 
On Page 20, this statement is also made: 
"There is proof, without contradiction, that beat 
built up in the vicinity of the large motor operat-
ing at 200 degrees temperature''. 
We have fully discussed in our statement of facts the 
lack of evidence to show how hot it really was, and it 
need not to be repeated here. 
A statement is also made concerning the fumes from 
the small motor. Then, counsel say 
''There is proof ---,- if any were needed of the 
fact of nature of which the Court will take judi-
cial notice - that such fumes, intermingled in 
the air, contained carbon dioxide, that with or 
without carbon dioxide, presence of the fumes 
lowered the oxygen content of the air which Jones 
breathed.'' 
What a lot of judicial knowledge this Court is expected 
to have? And how it is to be substituted for proof? 
More knowledge than even Plaintiffs' expert doctor 
had, so as to be able to find contrary to what he deter-
mined, as well as what the Commission who heard the 
evidence found. 
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(B) as stated on page 18, is as follows: 
"That there ,,~as no evidence that carbon dio-
xide gas was a factor." 
As we conceive it, this is simply a reiteration as a 
part of A, and what we have said under that head is 
all that need be said here, except that on page 21 the 
following occurs: 
''There is undisputed evidence that the air about 
the motor was filled with fumes, that oil ran 
down the sides of the defective pipe, that the 
motor, when turned over without igniting, would 
pump out this oil, and that the partially burned 
or heated oil would give off carbon dioxide.'' 
True, it is, that some of the Plaintiffs' witnesses 
so testified, except they did not attempt to designate 
the gas as carbon dioxide. That designation is the 
contribution of counsel. The statement poses this ques-
tion: If the gasoline did not ignite, what would cause 
the oil to burn, and give off gas, whether carbon dio-
xide, carbon monoxide, or any other gas? 
(C) as stated on Page 18, is as follows: 
"That there was no evidence in the case suffi-
cient to justify the finding of a sereve emotional 
upset.'' 
We have so fully covered this subject in our state-
ment of facts and in our argument under Point 1, that 
we deem any further discussion of the matter at this 
point unnecessary. 
(D) Counsel, in setting out the findings objected to 
under this head on Page 18, extracts parts of paragraphs 
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of the Decision, for which reason we quote the entire 
paragraphs instead of mere extracts therefrom as 
follows: 
' ' The evidence regarding exertion, fatigue, worry 
is very unsatisfactory. In fact, if we believe 
all that evidence, we must conclude that deceased 
was not subjected· to any of these factors in a 
degree materially in excess of the exertion, ete., 
to which all individuals in every walk of life or at 
hom~ are subjected. 
''The physicians who testified all stated that 
they were not concerned with exertion, gas, or 
fatigue except in combination. All of them stated 
that all of the circumstances combined might 
contribute to the occlusion. We do not believe 
that the combination of circumstances which ap-
plicant attempts to prove constitute an accident 
and that the employer should be ·charged with 
the results of a combination of forces operating 
within and without the employment over a period 
of days, particularly when everybody is almost 
daily subjected to the same force in .substan-
tially the same degree. Applicant cited author-
ity in support of the exertion theory but it should 
be noted that the experts used the words 'severe 
exertion' . The same is true of fatigue. There 
is no evidence of exertion or fatigue.'' 
As we see it, no complaint can be made with respect 
to these findings, because they do not on their face dis-
close any arbitrariness or capriciousness on the part of 
the Commission, and as we have repeatly pointed out, 
they are justified by the evidence. It would only be 
the hypercritical that could object to the last sentence, 
but it is perfectly obvious what the Commission meant 
and by implication intended to say, namely, that there 
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is no evidence of such exertion or fatigue, because in 
the sentence next but one preceding, the Commission 
was talking about severe exertion. In the next sentence, 
it is speaking of severe fatigue. So in the last sentence, 
it is speaking of such, that is, severe exertion, severe 
fatigue. Surely, this Court could not find that the 
Commission was arbitrary or capricious because of this 
linguistic technicality. 
Likewise, we do not believe the statement on page 
22 of (D) is justified. Counsel there say: 
''(D) The finding that the deceased was sub-
jected to normal worry, fatigue, exertion, such 
as individuals generally are subjected to in their 
daily lives, at work or at home, almost daily, in 
substantially the same degree indicates a com-
plete failure to evalute the evidence." 
In fact, as we view the evidence, the Commission 
in so finding, and here again it requires an impartial 
consideration of all the evidence to determine the mat-
ter, cannot he said to have acted arbitrarily or capri-
ciously. Indeed, even if this Court were required to 
pass upon the weight of the evidence, we submit it would 
find as the Commission did. 
(E) as stated on page 18, is as follows: 
''That there was not evidence sufficient to sup-
port a finding that the oxygen content of the air 
had been reduced sufficiently to cause a 'slud-
ging of the blood, which in turn caused the block-
ing of the coronary artery.''' 
In the argument, under this heading on page 25, 
counsel claim that the autopsy so shows. This is not 
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correct nor does the report of the autopsy so show. Cel" 
tainly not the quoted portion in the Brief. What the 
summary of the report of the autopsy does say is 
"The relationship of the immediate cause of 
occlusion is probably on the basis of an anoxia.'' 
Let it be assumed that anoxia means the same as anox-
emia, or a deficiency of oxygen. It is stated as a pro-
bability, and it is not stated where in the body it probably 
was, but Dr. ·Zeman, who performed the autopsy pro-
ably intended to say in the heart or circulatory sys-
tem. The record shows, then, that an anoxia was only 
a probability as far as Dr. Zeman was concerned, and 
it further shows that Dr. Zeman merely gave as his 
opinion another probability that sludging caused the 
anoxia. Contrary to counsel's statement, he did not 
and could not say either in his report of the autopsy 
or in his testimony that sludging did actually occur. 
It does not mean as we shall show, even if the 
sludging theory be accepted, that there was any proba-
bility of a deficiency in oxygen in the air Jones was 
breathing in the shed while at work on the small motor. 
On the contrary, as we have repeatedly stated, counsel 
are as wrong in interpreting the testimony of Dr. Zeman 
as they are with respect to his report. Although he 
said that a deficiency of oxygen in the air could be a 
cause of a coronary, it would depend entirely on the ex-
tent of the defieiency. He even ~ave what that extent 
would have to be, more than twenty percent, and inas-
much as it could not be determined whether there was 
any deficiency in the air Jones was breathing, or the 
extent of it, he entirely eliminated any deficiency in the 
air as a possible cause of the coronary occlusion which 
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Jones su,ffe:red, whether resulting from fumes, or other. 
wise, because it was impossible to determine its extent. 
Though he repeatedly so stated, this is best illustrated 
in a colloquy which took place between Commissioner 
Wiesley and Dr. Zeman at the conclusion of the Doctor's 
testimony as follows: 
''Com. Wiesley: We have to assume that there 
was sufficient carbon dioxide in this atmos-
phere to reduce the oxygen content to contribute 
to coronary occlusion, and yet nobody knows how 
much was in the air. We know it was a gasoline 
motor and the testimony has been there was smoke 
coming out at points from the cracks in the pipe 
and so on. It was not, on the other hand, a closed 
space. 
''A. I think the only way we could be positive 
about it would be to repeat the experiment and 
that is difficult, under the same temperature and 
so forth. You would have conclusive evidence.'' 
In other words, his testimony throughout was that 
the factors which might cause a coronary occlusion 
would depend upon their extent or degree whether it 
would be fatigue, as a result of insufficient rest, effort 
unusal to the work a person habitually does, or emo-
tional upset, resulting from a person being unable to 
do his work, or insufficiency of oxygen in the air. He 
eliminated the last in this case, because the assumed 
facts upon which the hypothetical question was based 
did not, as it could not, inform him as to the extent of 
the claimed deficiency in the air. He based his opinion 
solely upon the other assumed factors, which as stated 
in the question, whether they really existed or not, were 
sufficient to enable him to have an opinion as to their 
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extent. The reason, as we claim, that the Commission 
was justified in rejecting his conclusions is that it found 
as it had a right to do under the evidence that the facts 
assumed in the question did not exist. 
So far as the particular question is concerned, the 
result of the summary of the report of the autopsy and 
the doctor's testimony is that he must either be charged 
with inconsistency or he must account for his claim of 
a deficiency in some other way. This he does in this 
way: - knowing as he does that a person may have a 
coronary occlusion even when he is breathing the purest 
of air, he says that a deficiency in oxygen may he shown 
not because there is any deficiency of oxygen in the 
air, but because the person breathing that air is unable 
to take care of it in the normal way because of the other 
factors which may bring about that situation and may 
cause a sludging of the blood. 
This Court in the Woodburn case had before it just 
such a case. Woodburn was breathing the purest moun-
tain air up in Snow Basin, and yet he suffered a heart 
attack. Dr. Zeman was a witness in that case. That was 
not a death case so that no autopsy was had. If Wood-
burn had died, and the doctor arrived at the conclusion 
above stated, namely that there was a probability of a 
deficiency of oxygen, he would have to attempt to ac-
count for such deficiency as above stated. 
It must be horne in mind that we are considering 
what is at best a theory, which was rejected by Dr. Peter-
son, and by the Commission. We are therefore not 
concerned with its validity. All we are concerned with 
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is that the statement of the doctor who performed the 
autopsy that there was a probable deficiency of oxygen 
is no proof that, as contended by counsel, there was any 
deficiency of oxygen in the air Jones was breathing, 
and that we haYe now conclusively demonstrated. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Having now answered all of the contentions made 
by counsel for Plaintiffs' in their Brief; having shown 
that the Commission in making their findings did not act 
arbitrarily or capriciously, we respectfully submit its 
denial of an award in this case should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
Attorney General of the State of Utah 
Attorney for The Industrial Commission 
of Utah 
Utah State Capitol Bldg., 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
HOWELL, STINE AND OLMSTEAD 
Attorneys for California Packing 
Corporation 
625 Eccles Building 
Ogden, Utah 
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